|
(Cite as: 121 N.Y. 266, 24 N.E. 469)
Copr.@West
2000 No Claim to Orig U.S. Govt. Works
PEOPLE
v CHAPLEAU
Court
of Appeals of New York.
April
29, 1890.
Appeal from court of oyer and
terminer, Clinton county.
CRIMINAL
LAW ~521
110k521
A person arrested for murder made a statement before the coroner, at the
inquest, after he had been informed as to his right to testify or not, and
that the deposition might be used against him thereafter. Subsequently he
refused to sign it, and denied having made it. Held, that his statement
was voluntary, and admissible against him on his trial for the homicide,
under Code Cr.Pro 395,
providing that the confession of a defendant, whether in the course of
judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence
against him unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats,
or upon a stipulation of the district attorney that he should not be
prosecuted therefor.
CRIMINAL
LAW ~742(3)
110k742(3)
A witness for the prosecution denied at the inquest
knowledge of facts subsequently testified to by him. Another witness
withheld a portion of his testimony when examined before the coroner. Both
avowed fright at being brought into the affair as the explanation of their
conduct, and neither were otherwise impeached. Held, that it was for the
jury to pass upon their credibility.
HOMICIDE
~253(1)
203k53( 1)
Evidence held to sustain conviction of murder in the
first degree.
*267 James Averill, for appellant.
*268 Samuel L. Wheeler,
Dist. Atty.,
for respondent.
GRAY,
J.
The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in
the first degree for the killing of Irwin E. Tabor, and he was tried at a court of oyer and terminer held in and for Clinton
county. The jury rendered a verdict in accordance with the charge in the
indictment, and sentence of death was passed. From the judgment of
conviction the defendant has appealed to this court, and his counsel
assigns as grounds for sustaining his appeal the admission of improper and
incompetent evidence, and the
insufficiency of the evidence to convict for murder in the first degree.
We have carefully read and considered the proofs in this record relied on
to establish the defendant's guilt. We are satisfied that no injustice has
been committed against him in the trial upon the *269 indictment, and that
the verdict could not have been otherwise rendered by sensible men.
The
occurrence of the killing was in this wise, as it is made to appear from
the whole record: The defendant lived near the village of Plattsburgh, and
was employed in the hauling of wood. About 4 o'clock on Monday afternoon,
January 28, 1889, he and two other teamsters were returning home with
their sleds, when, at a point in the road, they met the deceased driving
himself in a sleigh. He turned out with a nod of recognition, and passed
the three teams, of which the defendant's led. After passing, defendant
attacked the deceased, struck him upon the head with a wooden stake, and
knocked him out of his sleigh upon the road, where he shortly after
expired from his injuries. This attack was testified to by one of the
teamsters, Nelson Brown; the other one having died since the occurrence.
Brown's attention was attracted by hearing the defendant address the
deceased with loud and violent language. He looked behind, and saw the
deceased stricken down from his seat, and fall upon the road. Of other
witnesses, evidence was had of his loud and abusive exclamations; of his
hastening from the rear of the teams where the body lay, with a stake in
his hand, to catch up with his team, which had gone on ahead; and of the
finding of the body upon the road, with the head battered almost beyond
recognition, with the blanket and buffalo robe still wrapped about his
person, and with a piece of the driving reins tightly **470 grasped in his mittened hands.
Evidence was
also adduced of the defendant's saying to the officer who had arrested him
the same evening, and was conducting him to Plattsburgh, 'I do not think
that Mr. Tabor will poison any more cows.' This remark had reference to
the prisoner's previous statements, testified to by witnesses, that the
deceased had poisoned his cow. The utterance of threats by the defendant
against the life of the deceased was also proved. One neighbor testified
that the defendant had threatened to shoot Tabor, remarking that he had
injured his cow. Another testified that the night before, when the
defendant was at his house, he had narrated a conversation had with Tabor
on til *270 road. He told witness that he had called Tabor 'cow doctor,
Vermonter;' and Tabor had told him to 'shut up his head;' and he had
answered back, 'I will not shut up my head, but I am going to shut up your
head for you, and when I shut it up it will stay shut.' When the wife of
the witness, hearing this, said, 'If you was to do that to Mr. Tabor, you
would be apt to get a rope around your neck,' he replied: 'Mrs. Brown,
people will be so glad to get that long body destroyed, people will not
hurt me much. Any way, they do not hang any more. If I was going to be
killed, I would be killed that new way.'
The next day after the
occurrence, when the coroner held his inquest, the foreman of his jury,
who was also the sheriff, stated that Chapleau, the prisoner, wanted to
come before the jury and make a statement. He was brought in, and what he
then said was reduced to writing by the coroner.
That official, being examined as a witness upon the trial, gave in
evidence the statements of the defendant as taken down by him at the time
of the inquest. He testified, from his minutes, that he informed the
prisoner, before the jury, as to his right to depose or not, as he thought
fit, and that the deposition might be used against him thereafter; that
the prisoner elected of his own free will to be sworn, and asked to be
allowed to testify. The prisoner's story was then given as thus stated, in
which he represented the occurrence as provoked by deceased. He stated
that the deceased referred to his remarks about poisoning cows, and jumped
from his cutter upon the sled, with something in his hand; whereupon he
(the prisoner) hit him with the stake. He also stated that the deceased
had threatened to shoot him, and that they had had disputes concerning
this alleged poisoning of his cows by the deceased.
As against the
people's evidence the prisoner adduced some evidence of his good
character.
The charge of the trial judge was very fair, and was not
excepted to; nor was it really exceptionable in its instructions to the
jury.
But the appellant's counsel relies and insists upon certain features
of the case, as it was developed upon the trial, as exhibiting a lack of
creditable evidence upon which to
*271
the incompetency of the coroner's evidence of the statements of the
accused; and the inadmissibility of the evidence of what the prisoner had
said while under arrest, immediately after the occurrence. These points we
will consider.
Three
elements enter into the proof convicting the defendant of the crime
charged in the indictment. They are: The testimony of an eye-witness of
the occurrence; the admissions and statements of the prisoner, and
corroborating circumstances in the evidence, of previous threats by the
prisoner; and of what transpired about the time of the killing, according
to the evidence of persons who, while not seeing the actual killing, saw
the prisoner and the deceased on the road. They had observed his actions,
and saw the condition in which the body of the deceased was found.
Before
considering the points of the appellant's counsel, we may here say that
the prisoner's statements of what occurred between him and the deceased
are absolutely negatived by the facts. The position in which the body of
the deceased was found made it impossible that he should have jumped from
his cutter upon the defendant's sled to attack him, or that any attack
could have been made by the deceased. The body was found upon the road,
with the hands clenched in front, and still holding the broken rein. The
blanket was around his legs, and the buffalo robe partly under
and up under his
right arm.
Such circumstantial evidence made it clear that the deceased was
stricken down while on his seat in the sleigh, and engaged in driving his
horses.
The accused, after making this deposition before the coroner and
jury, refused, upon the subsequent day, to sign it, and denied making it.
This subsequent action of the accused may have been predicated upon one of
two mental conditions: Either that he was unwilling to sign a false
statement, or else that subsequent reflection made him regret having made
any statement at all. But the defendant's counsel argues that the
statement before the coroner was inadmissible in evidence upon the trial;
and he places the objection on the ground that the prisoner was then
confined in jail upon the charge of murder, and that
*272 was not a voluntary statement.
These were not the grounds of the objection taken at
the trial. At that time they were that the statements were not signed by
the party. But, overlooking the absence of other objections, we will
consider if any injustice was done, or any legal error committed in the
reception of the coroner's evidence.
The object of the law has always been the
accomplishment of justice by eliciting the truth about an occurrence in
such a mode as to minimize the chances of error and mistake, and to charge
the accused with guilt by the most direct proofs; and the aim
of statutes of criminal procedure is to secure the punishment of a person,
indicted for a crime, only by methods consistent with the maintenance of
every safeguard against error and self-crimination. The design of the
state is always to preserve intact for the benefit of the accused the
presumption of his innocence, in the proceedings for his conviction, and
courts should endeavor to scrupulously guard his privileges in that
respect, and rather to err on the side of a tender regard for his rights;
for the penalty is death.
Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that, where a party is examined **471
before a magistrate, he shall be informed as to his rights and privileges
with respect to making any statements.
Section 200 provides that the
statement must be reduced to writing, and, if defendant refuses to sign
it, his reason therefor must be stated, and it must be signed and
certified by the magistrate. These conditions were met in the present
case.
Section 395 has provided that the confession of a defendant, whether
in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given
in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced
by threats, or upon a stipulation of the district attorney that he shall
not be prosecuted therefor. The question, then, is, was the statement of
the prisoner made before the coroner and jury admissible to prove the
homicide? Clearly it was, under the provisions of section 395. It was made
at his own election and request, and without the operation of the
influences of fear, produced by threats, or of *273 hope, under a
stipulation that he would not be prosecuted. It was admissible even before
the enactment of the Code provision; for it was voluntary, because it was
made at the prisoner's own suggestion.
The case of People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384, cited by
the counsel for the appellant, is not against the principle of its
admissibility. In that case the prisoner was arrested as the probable
murderer; taken before the coroner, then holding an inquest over the body
of the deceased; and was sworn and examined as a witness. Upon the trial
his evidence so taken was read against him. This was held to be an error;
but the ground taken by the court was that the testimony before the
coroner was in its nature unreliable evidence, and that the reason of the
rule of law which demanded its exclusion was in that consideration. It
could not be said that the statements proceeded from the internal and
spontaneous impulses of the prisoner alone, or were uninfluenced by any
extraneous cause of sufficient force to prevent free and voluntary mental action; and that a judicial oath,
administered when the mind was agitated by a criminal charge, might have
that effect. Judge SELDEN delivered the opinion in that case, and he
discussed the meaning of the term voluntary,' in reference to confessions.
He thought there was an obvious principle underlying the rule which
excluded the statements of a prisoner, where not made free from outside
influences of a nature disturbing to the mind. He stated it to be that 'we
cannot safely judge of the relations between the motives and the
declarations of the accused, when to the natural agitation consequent upon
being charged with crime is superadded the disturbance produced by hopes
or fears artificially excited;' and he defined a voluntary confession as
one 'proceeding from the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own mind,
free from the influence of any extraneous disturbing cause.' In the case
of Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7, the statements of the prisoner before
the coroner, being voluntarily made, and after he had been informed that
he was under no obligation to testify, were held properly admitted upon
the *274 trial. The People v. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. Rep. 496, was
a recent case, decided since the passage of the Code. There the
examination before the coroner was excluded, not because of any principle
of inadmissibility inherent in the evidence generally, but because it had
not, and could not have been in the nature of things, a voluntary
confession. There, the prisoner, upon being arrested, was brought before
the coroner as a witness and examined. He was an ignorant man, was
unattended by counsel, and was not informed of his rights or privileges as
to testifying. Judge RAPALLO reviewed this question of the admissibility
of the examination of persons under oath before a magistrate or coroner.
He held that they must be excluded upon the subsequent trial for the
offense, under circumstances where the prisoner, having been arrested as a
suspected murderer, was taken before the coroner's inquest or examining
magistrate, and there examined on oath as to circumstances tending to
connect him with the crime. His opinion was given with reference to the
facts of the case before him, which showed that there was no confession,
but an examination before a magistrate. He expressly held that section 395
of the Code was intended to apply only to voluntary confessions, and not
to change the statutory rules relating to the examination of prisoners
charged with crime. It is thus perfectly clear that both before and since
the enactment of the Code provisions the test of admissibility of the
statements of a party accused
of the commission of a crime, whether made in the course of judicial
proceedings or not, is whether they were voluntary; and that can be
determined by their nature, and the circumstances under which made. If in
all respects, and however viewed, they could only have been the voluntary
and uninfluenced statements of the individual, no principle of law
warrants their exclusion; and the Code expressly authorizes their being
given in evidence upon the trial.
The appellant's counsel argues that it was error to admit the testimony
of a witness as to what the defendant said to the *275 officer shortly
after the arrest. No objection was taken at the trial; and, as the
defendant's statements were voluntary ones, no objection would be tenable.
It is no ground for the exclusion of admissions that they were made while
the party was under arrest, if shown to have been made voluntarily, and
free from influences of promises or threats. Balbo v. People, 80 N. Y.
484.
Another ground of error presented is that the jury
should not have been allowed to consider the testimony of Nelson and Peter
Brown. The appellant's
counsel argues that they were perjured witnesses, on their own showing. If
this were true, it would be no reason for any such instruction by the
court to the jury. But it is not a correct conclusion from the facts
respecting these witnesses.
They were evidently men of low intellectual
order, and dull of comprehension, and frightened at being drawn into the
case. Nelson Brown was the eye-witness of the occurrence; **472 and Peter
Brown was the person at whose house, the evening before, the defendant had
repeated his threats made to the deceased. Nelson Brown at first denied
knowledge of the facts to which he on a subsequent day of the holding of
the inquest did testify. Peter Brown did not state upon his examination
before the coroner the facts of the conversation. It does not appear that
they had any motives for this conduct, or were influenced otherwise than
by fright or some kindred emotion. That was most probably the truth of the
matter as to both; and possibly, in the case of Nelson Brown, there may
have been superadded the motive to shield a friend. At any rate, upon the
trial they avowed their fright as the cause and explanation. They were not
otherwise impeached as witnesses, and the judge commented in his charge
upon the testimony of these witnesses, and said it was open to the
criticism of counsel for the defendant, and he instructed the jury that
they must be satisfied of its truthfulness.
We think that it was for the jury to pass upon the question of the
credibility of these witnesses. It was formerly held to be the rule that
where a witness was shown to have willfully sworn falsely in a former
proceeding *276 in the case, or upon the trial, or, as in the case of
People v. Evans, 40 N. Y. 1, where the false swearing was instigated by
the prisoner, and the witness had been promised a reward for so swearing,
that the jury should be instructed to disregard the testimony of such
witness. Dunlop v. Patterson, 5 Cow. 243, is an early and leading case on
that subject. The doctrine as to the treatment of testimony which is
affected by contradictions and inconsistencies; or by evidence making its
falsity manifest, and establishing a consciousness in the witness of its
falsity, has been much considered in the books. Opinions have not always
been in accord; but the weight of authority was in favor of the general
rule that the question of credibility of a witness was one for the jury,
and that the only exception to the rule was in cases where the
discrepancies in the testimony were the result of deliberate falsehood.
The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339; Conrad v. Williams, 6 Hill, 446;
People v. Evans, supra; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172; Pease v. Smith, 61
N. Y. 477; Place v. Minster, 65
N. Y.
89; People v. Petmecky, 99 N. Y. 415, 2 N. E. Rep. 145. But since the
enactment of section 714 of the Penal Code, and section 832 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, we must hold that a new rule obtains, and that the rule
and policy of the law are to allow all testimony to go to, and be weighed
by, the jury. By those sections a person convicted of any crime is,
notwithstanding, a competent witness in any cause or proceeding, civil or
criminal; but proof of his conviction is allowed for the purpose of
affecting the weight of his testimony. In People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 266,
16 N. E. Rep. 68, the court had refused to charge that if the jury should
find that certain witnesses had, in their previous testimony in respect to
the same matters, committed willful perjury, the jury should wholly
disregard their testimony given on the trial. This was held not to be
error; and ANDREWS, J., said, in reference to the force of section 714 of
the Penal Code: 'It would be manifestly absurd, in the light of this
statute, now to hold that an unconvicted perjurer was an incompetent
witness, whose evidence could
not be considered by the jury, when, under the statute, if h *277 had been
convicted his evidence must be received and weighed by the jury.'
Here the
witnesses, in testifying to facts of which upon the preliminary
examination they had denied
knowledge, or which they had suppressed, may have
been moved and deterred, as they swore they were, by motives of fright;
and they appear to have been perfectly free from improper instigations or
motives to swear falsely. At any rate, it was for the jury to decide
whether they were to be believed or not. There was other evidence of a
circumstantial nature clearly pointing to the defendant as the perpetrator
of the crime, and which the jury could consider the
connection with the evidence assailed. The judgment of conviction should
be affirmed.
|